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Abstract: Despite being a mainstay of modern economic theory, the concept of 
arbitrage is sorely misused. In this paper we overview such instances, and offer an 
alternative definition. Most applications of arbitrage use it as a general equilibrating 
tendency irrespective of whether the outcome is certain. Alternatively, it can be used in 
a rather “loose” manner to apply to inter-temporal scenarios or situations involving 
multiple (though similar) goods. Our aim is twofold: first to provide a consistent 
definition of arbitrage and second, to integrate the activity of arbitrage in the world of 
uncertainty and entrepreneurship that characterizes the Austrian school of economics.   
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Arbitrage vs. Speculation 
Arbitrage is commonly defined as “the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or 
essentially similar, security in two different markets for advantageously different 
prices” (Sharpe and Alexander 1990). It is important to highlight that the act of 
arbitrage is only that of trading the asset and the concept says nothing of the costs to 
obtain the knowledge of the existence of the mispricing: the knowledge of the relevant 
prices is assumed. It is also assumed that all relevant costs, e.g., transportation, storage, 
etc., are included in the arbitrageur’s calculus.  
The appeal of arbitrage as a practical matter is apparent: arbitrage allows an 
individual to obtain scarce means at no cost and with complete certainty. It is also clear 
that, given their pecuniary attractiveness, all arbitrage opportunities will be quickly 
acted on until they disappear. “Out of the market” buyers and sellers will be matched 
until the asset holdings of the marginal buyer and seller cannot be arbitraged further. 
While this action implies that one side of the arbitrage will earn profits, it also 
implies that the other side of the transaction will experience an (at least) implicit loss.  
By not acting upon a possible arbitrage opportunity he is giving away some useful and 
scarce economic goods to the arbitrageur for the difference between the price traded and 
the best one available.  
The difference between arbitrage and speculation is that of certainty. Both 
actions are aimed at obtaining a profit but the former secures a current profit with no 
possibility of loss (i.e., it is certain) while the latter expects to get a profit in the future 
but can incur a loss (i.e., it is uncertain). It is for this reason that we can predict that any 
arbitrage opportunity will disappear as soon as it is discovered while we cannot make 
the same statement about speculative situations.  
Despite the certainty of arbitrage, some economists maintain that all exchanges 
are speculative (e.g., Mises 1949: 113; Huerta de Soto 2010a: 69). These disparate 
views can be reconciled in two ways.  
The first is by acknowledging that arbitrageurs face the risk of losing one of the 
prices (i.e., incur operational risk) on the sell-side of the transaction. Since every action 
takes place in time, even if an individual has found a pair of prices that can be 
arbitraged, he may find one or both have “disappeared” during the process of the trade. 
(It is in this very context that Mises claims all market exchanges to be speculative.) The 
trader cannot be certain as to whether the prices will still be available in the very near 
future (even seconds), so when he embarks in the act of trading he is speculating that 
the prices will still be valid.1 On the one hand, this operational risk will not stop the 
arbitrageur from trying since the arbitrageur does perceive the opportunity to exist, 
regardless of its actuality or expected duration. On the other hand, if the prices are no 
longer available at the moment of trade it must be that the arbitrage opportunity has 
been exploited (even if only accidentally) thus validating the statement that arbitrage 
situations will disappear once discovered.2 
Second, we may reconcile the two disparate viewpoints by revisiting the theory 
of price formation. Since no individuals can know all the prices in an economy, it is 
possible that by chance an individual will find both a buyer and a seller whose prices 
                                                            
1
 At the limit, one type of high-frequency trade is arbitrage, and it is in this sense that the activity is 
widely seen as equilibrating (Narang 2013). Alternatively, some forms of high frequency trading not 
reliant on arbitrage-type trades are thought to create mispricings that in turn require an arbitrageable 
correction (Jarrow and Protter 2012). Of course, it is questionable whether these mispricings can 
adequately be attributed to arbitrage-type trades. As Friedman (1953) famously argued, “to say that 
arbitrage is destabilizing is equivalent to saying that arbitrageurs lose money on average.” Vuillemey 
(2015) overviews the dubious claim that high-frequency trading represents arbitrage trades given the 
delayed nature of settlements.  
2
 Note that enacting an unrelated trade may correct an arbitrageable mispricing. By way of example, 
consider that U.S. dollars may be cheaper than Australian dollars in the United States than they are in 
Australia. A European who starts demanding more U.S. dollars to shift a trade from Australia to the 
United States, and who in turn reduces his demand for Australian dollars, will re-equilibrate the 
Australian dollar-U.S. dollar exchange rate, though not through any arbitrage activity.  
can be arbitraged. We cannot expect, however, this to be the situation in all cases. It is 
more likely that individuals will purposely try to find arbitrageable prices, i.e. that they 
will have to embark in the entrepreneurial action of seeking out arbitrage opportunities. 
Since this amounts to speculation given that the agent cannot be sure as to whether he 
will find such situations, the success of the outcome will be uncertain. This realization 
creates a necessity to distinguish between two different activities, (1) that of arbitraging 
two or more known prices and (2) that of discovering arbitrageable prices. The former is 
an action with a certain success predicated on the successful discovery of misaligned 
prices, while the latter is shrouded in uncertainty.  
One conclusion from this reconciliation is that only in a world where all 
information pertaining to price formation was fully known would there be no arbitrage 
opportunities. Since all prices would be known to all in such a world, there would be no 
asset for which an individual could offer less than the marginal bid or pay more than the 
marginal offer. As a practical matter, information is dispersed throughout the economy 
and created continuously through the entrepreneurial process of price discovery and 
formation (Huerta de Soto 2010a).  Arbitrage opportunities may still appear, though if 
discovered they will be exploited by alert individuals. Just as entrepreneurs embark in 
different enterprises to satisfy the needs of consumers and will be later followed by 
others if they prove successful, some entrepreneurs will try to profit by finding arbitrage 
opportunities with competition among them playing the same role as in any other 
market. The continuous and unpredictable creation of information and the uncertainty 
that naturally follows is the source of arbitrage opportunities. 
It is not only arbitrageurs who will act in a way that reduces the amount and 
magnitude of arbitrageable opportunities, but regular market participants (those agents 
who enact trades not motivated by arbitrage) will also use their entrepreneurial faculties 
in order to find the best available. In both cases, arbitrageurs and regular market 
participants thus pursue their role in the same manner. By exercising their 
entrepreneurial foresight they are able to secure risky profits due to market 
“mispricings”.3  
Since the concept of arbitrage is important for financial analysis, we propose to 
rectify our misgivings of the current definition with an alternative: “An arbitrage is 
when one or more assets are bought or sold simultaneously, resulting in a monetary 
profit at the trade’s completion, even if the magnitude of such profit is unknown in 
advance.” Important in this definition is that it is constrained exclusively to monetary 
profits after a trade is settled with no reference to psychic profits.4  
Our more narrow definition serves a three-fold purpose. First, it places the 
activity back into its proper domain and excludes many similar or analogous exchanges 
(e.g., convergence trades) from its implications. Second, our modified definition 
includes all types of transactions not only those referring to a single asset as stated in 
the law of one price, which becomes only one, although probably the most relevant, 
case of arbitrage. Third, it provides a more comprehensive view of the price formation 
process, and gives a heightened emphasis on entrepreneurial foresight to align prices, 
both intra-temporally in the case of traditional arbitrage opportunities and inter-
temporally in the case of purely speculative endeavors.  
 
                                                            
3
 Mises (1949: 338) refers to these mispricings as “false prices” which exist at any given time because 
they don`t reflect the information that some other agents are, at the same time, willing to offer less than 
the bid prices or above the offer. Uncertainty is the reason these situations may exist, and the market 
process the reason why they won`t last. 
4
 More to the point, once the trade is settled this implies that its monetary profit is certain. The extent of 
this profit is still unknown and non-monetary losses due to, e.g., declines in purchasing power could still 
occur. 
Arbitrage in Modern Financial Economics  
The main literature of arbitrage in financial economics can be divided between: (1) 
pricing theories such as the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) and arbitrage pricing 
theory (APT), and (2) studies about convergence trades or limited arbitrage, such as 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Kondor (2006).  
 
Pricing Theories 
Although standard economic theory has a well-grounded definition of arbitrage, the 
absence of uncertainty in its asset pricing creates some inconsistent statements related to 
arbitrage. For example, Varian (1987: 59) expresses the no arbitrage condition in 
equilibrium as: 
If Rx ≥ 0 then we must have px ≥ 0, 
where Rx is the portfolio’s pattern of returns and px the cost of the same portfolio. If a 
portfolio has a positive return it must also have a positive price. Varian’s no arbitrage 
condition matches the arbitrage definition proposed here to the extent that any 
combination of arbitrageable assets can be considered as forming a portfolio. The 
problem with this concept of arbitrage appears, as it does in other applied models, when 
the model cannot capture uncertainty. 
The main representative of standard pricing models is the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory developed by Ross (1976).5 As in the CAPM pioneered by Sharpe (1964), the 
objective is to find a causal relationship between risk and return for different assets and 
portfolios. Specifically, the expected return of an asset within the CAPM framework 
                                                            
5
 A very readable summary of this literature can be found in Roll and Ross (1995). 
hinges on (1) the rate of return of some risk-free asset, (2) the rate of return of the 
general market portfolio, and (3) the degree of correlation between the asset in 
question’s return and that of the general market index, as measured by beta. 
What the CAPM states is that if two or more different assets have the same risk 
relative to the “market” (i.e., beta) they will have the same expected return. There are no 
arbitrage opportunities available as the relevant prices will adjust until expected risk-
adjusted returns equalize. Stated differently, in equilibrium there are no strict arbitrages 
to exploit, at least not according to any traditional use of the term, as the CAPM deals 
with distinct assets whose prices differ only due to their risk profiles. By purchasing and 
selling different assets simultaneously an equilibrium is reached but the investor is 
taking on risk according to the profiles of the assets traded (or, at least, the risk as 
defined by beta with respect to the general market return). 
Instead of using the “market” as benchmark, the APT takes various systematic 
factors, including (as in Roll and Ross 1995), (1) unanticipated inflation, (2) changes in 
the expected level of industrial production, (3) unanticipated shifts in risk premiums, or 
(4) unanticipated movements in the shape of the term structure of interest rates. The 
return of an asset is determined by its sensitivity to any number of factors, defined by 
factor specific betas.  
As in the CAPM, in a well-diversified portfolio the idiosyncratic factors 
affecting return cancel out so “returns on large portfolios are influenced mainly by the 
systematic factors alone” (Roll and Ross 1995: 122). While seemingly similar to the 
CAPM with only the addition of further factors affecting return, the APT also makes the 
claim that if two different portfolios have the same sensitivity to each factor they can be 
arbitraged. Indeed, it will be the very act of arbitrage which keeps asset prices in 
equilibrium according to APT, while in CAPM equilibrium obtains through a trial and 
error process which standardizes risk-adjusted returns. 
Since the concept of beta is integral to both analyses, it is instructive to point out 
two details before questioning whether they are useful tools to signal arbitrage 
opportunities (at least according to APT).  
First, betas are not exhaustive. The return on any asset at every point of time 
cannot be explained completely by the combination of betas and the change of 
systematic factors; the idiosyncratic and other unidentified factors also play a role. Even 
in the context of a well diversified portfolio neither the CAPM nor the APT can affirm 
that the different idiosyncratic factors must necessarily cancel out. In other words, the 
determining factors of an asset’s return, as well as its associated betas, can never be 
completely defined. This insight is one key in understanding why empirical tests of the 
CAPM point to its inability to explain actual returns fully, and also why theorists have 
constructed ever more complex pricing models to include more factors to correct these 
misgivings. Fama and French (1992, 1995) argue that the CAPM is misspecified as a 
result of stocks with high (low) book-to-market values earning a high (low) return 
because the former have different risk factors than that offered by the general market. 
Although they do not identify such a factor, they argue that a different “general market” 
return – that of the high book-to-value stocks – will proxy for such a factor, which they 
coin the “distress factor”.6 The continued poor performance of the CAPM to accurately 
predict risk-adjusted security returns provides at least prima facie evidence that the 
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 In a similar vein APT follows this logic by extending the potential factors to any number, depending on 
the specific model’s specifications. What these attempts, and others like them, overlook is that relevant 
factors can never be fully elaborated and thus a sizable error variable will remain a feature of all pricing 
models dependent on them. 
relevant factors are yet to be fully elaborated on, or that they cannot be fully 
enumerated, or most commonly, that such betas are subject to change. 
Second, a beta itself is a simplification of very complex phenomena (perhaps it 
is even better described as a metaphor of finance, as in Phillips (2010). Beta describes in 
a single number the causal relationship in a very simple way (typically linear) between 
the change in a systematic factor and the return on a particular asset. As a practical 
matter the process is much more complex. Consider the following example: assume 
there is a change in inflation expectations. How will this affect the price of given stock, 
ceteris paribus? First, the very term “inflation expectations” does not refer to a simple 
or even unique phenomenon. Inflation expectations differ depending on the specific 
asset, or its location in the productive structure of the economy (e.g., due to “Cantillon 
effects” of changes to the money supply, as in Bagus and Howden (2012: 272-73)). On 
an epistemic level the expectation about inflation will either be skewed by the 
individual’s specific knowledge of the inflationary process or by his location with 
respect to the source of the inflationary shock (Howden 2010).  There is also the issue 
of the inflation expectation being unique to the individual due to the assets that he 
considers relevant in his inflation-estimating calculus. Given these difficulties we can 
only know, and in an imprecise way, historical reactions to similar situations as we 
cannot completely isolate the impact of one factor, even one as seemingly simple as 
inflation expectations. It is also clear that even in the unlikely case that the same change 
of expectations were to take place in the future its impact does not have to be the same 
as a result of either a change in the sensitivity of the asset to the factor in question, or 
because the factor itself is a less (or more) important determinant of the final return (i.e., 
its weighting has changed).  
These criticisms are not especially new. As early as Roll (1977) the applicability 
of the very concept of the “general market return” which beta will express sensitivity to, 
was demonstrated to be an unobservable variable.  Still, a beta may be a useful device 
mindful of several caveats. It is not predictive, nor can it foretell the future behavior of 
prices. This simple insight is instrumental for the task at hand because it implies that, at 
least according to our definition of arbitrage and its more traditional variants, betas 
cannot be arbitraged (as in Ross (1976) and Roll and Ross (1995)).  
At this juncture we can see the difference between the “soft” statement by the 
CAPM, in which there is room for speculation as asset prices will adjust to their specific 
risk as perceived by market participants, and the “hard” version of the APT, in which 
different portfolios with the same betas will be arbitraged as their respective future 
returns are already implied by them. If betas cannot be arbitraged it follows that neither 
can portfolios based on them.  
 
Limited Arbitrage or Convergence Trades 
Convergence trades are situations where two or more assets are known or thought to 
converge at some point in the future, notwithstanding the fact that the prices may 
diverge in the present. Assume that two assets with very similar cash flows currently 
trade at different prices for exogenous reasons. Arbitrageurs should enter both markets 
simultaneously to take advantage of the pricing differential. They are exposed to 
potential losses as there is no reason why prices should converge immediately or even 
within the time deemed profitable by the cost of capital. As arbitrageurs are capital 
constrained any further divergence of prices, be they exogenous, e.g., Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), or endogenous, e.g., Kondor (2009), may lead to an even wider 
divergence as arbitrageurs unwind their positions to cover capital losses.7 
Although these trades are commonly viewed as cases ripe for arbitrage the 
literature acknowledges the risk element apparent in them (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Kondor (2009:1) readily admits that when he uses the term “arbitrageur” in these cases 
he does so somewhat “loosely”. Under our own definition these could only be 
considered as arbitrage trades if the action of the trade resulted in a profit at the moment 
the trade is enacted, and at every point until the convergence was complete.  
First let us look at the example of limited arbitrage proposed by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997): the arbitrageur buys in London and sells in Frankfurt the same Bund 
future at different prices.8 Why should we not consider this arbitrage? Should not the 
two equivalent assets trade at the same price always? One reason they are not equivalent 
assets is because neither of them can necessarily be delivered on the other market. (If 
this was possible we can easily see that the arbitrageur would not need capital, he would 
buy in London and sell in Frankfurt and settle the transaction by delivering the London 
contract to his counterparty in Frankfurt, thus profiting the difference.) On the contrary, 
if he cannot deliver his London contract to cover his short we must say that he has two 
different assets even though they represent the same type of claim to equivalent cash 
flows. Since he will need capital in order to face the margin requirements in both 
exchanges the prices of the two otherwise identical assets can diverge owing to liquidity 
conditions on their specific market. The risk that a mispricing becomes even more 
pronounced and causes short-term losses jeopardizing the liquidity of the arbitrageur is 
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 Alternatively, if these divergences are caused by uninformed “noise traders” informed arbitrageurs may 
be bid out of the market as divergences grow too wide or persist for longer than their liquidity allows for 
(De Long et al. 1990).  
8
 A similar example in the context of the equity market can be found on Froot and Dabora (1999). 
a common element in risky arbitrage models (Grossman and Miller 1988; De Long et 
al. 1990; Campbell and Kyle 1993).9 Because of the threat of losses from a market-
specific loss of liquidity, we can see the importance of our proposed redefinition of 
arbitrage as it rules out any possibility of future losses. Therefore in this case there is no 
arbitrage as traditionally stated, or even limited arbitrage in the sense of Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997), but rather pure speculation.10  
It is important to highlight here that speculation not only refers to actions in 
which we cannot be certain as to the future value of an asset. Using leverage to buy a 
bond assumed to have no default risk is hardly considered limited arbitrage even though 
it does present the same situation: even if the value at some point in the future is known 
it will vary in the meantime, e.g., due to collateral requirements and liquidity 
constraints, thus creating the possibility temporary losses until the maturity of both 
contracts.  
The problem lays in the modifier in the term “limited arbitrage”. While it does 
represent a convergence trade, differing liquidity positions in different exchanges (or 
wherever the asset in question is traded) give rise to a degree of risk on the otherwise 
riskless trade.  In sum, there can be only speculation or arbitrage, and never the twain 
shall meet.  
 
Salvaging Arbitrage 
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 These “risky arbitrage” models show that not all “arbitrage”-type opportunities will be exploited owing 
to liquidity constraints. Alternatively, in Dias de Sousa and Howden (2013), arbitrage trades may not 
occur because divergent prices for equivalent assets in different markets do not actually represent a 
misalignment in need of arbitrage. If the assets trade on separate markets, differences in, e.g., discount 
rates, will create unique present values giving the appearance of a pricing discrepancy when none exists.  
10 This example raises a deeper question as to what assets can the law of one price apply to, specifically 
what attributes constitute the “same” good. Multiple physically identical goods with the same end (as is 
the case with financial assets trading in separate markets) cannot be considered candidates for the law 
of one price (and by extension, arbitrage) since ancillary conditions concerning their tradability (such as 
liquidity or settlement constraints) can and do differ.  
The existence of derivatives and assets with very similar cash flows (e.g. bonds of the 
same issuer with slightly different maturities) has given rise to a business model 
centered on “arbitraging” the mispricing.11  In light of our previous discussion 
questioning the applicability of the concept of arbitrage to most exchanges, this raises 
the question of the practical matter of arbitrage profits across different securities, 
instead of the more traditional form of arbitrage which is confined to a unique asset. 
While such an application is similar, it is a distinct analysis in need of a different 
standard to uphold it to. Such a standard is to be found in a modified definition of 
arbitrage, though one which must also contain several key characteristics: (1) an 
immediate profit coupled with (2) certainty.  
Any transaction that does not meet those two cannot be considered arbitrage.  
The reason arises from the lack of knowledge, or uncertainty that exists regarding the 
future. If an exchange results in even a temporary loss we cannot state we are locking in 
a profit with certainty at the time of contract. Since we cannot be sure of the future 
value there remains the possibility that the trade will not result in a profit at its time of 
completion. Alternatively, even if the trader is assured that at some future date a profit 
will be available, he will be uncertain as to whether he will be able to complete the 
exchange at that date. Perhaps his personal liquidity position will dictate that he needs 
to end the transaction early, or his own untimely end may dictate that the deal is 
terminated. In all cases, it is not only the risk apparent in the future value of the asset 
but also in the trader’s future personal experiences that remove the possibility of a 
successful arbitrage opportunity.  
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 Long-Term Capital Management remains one of the most famous, and ultimately least successful, 
investment companies making use of this convergence strategy.  
Our clarified definition of arbitrage allows for only those transactions that 
immediately allow for a profit, even if the magnitude is not known in advance. Many 
convergence type trades have this property of a temporary profit, albeit one that can turn 
into a loss. This is especially apparent in the pricing of derivative products as well as 
with well-known theories such as put-call parity (Stoll 1969) and the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model (Hull 2009: 285-286).  For example, purchasing an option with a 
negative premium locks in a minimum profit, the extent of which will depend on if and 
to what extent the option is in-the-money.  The existence of these trades are important 
to the extent that they illustrate why the concept of “certainty” is important in arbitrage, 
as it excludes many transactions that are approximately like arbitrage save for this 
feature. 
Note that this definition does not concern the number of assets involved or the 
maturity matching of cash flows or asset maturities. The only concern is the realization 
of a profit. Alternatively, one can think of this definition as being any trade for which 
the net present value is positive at all times. This definition subsumes the more standard 
definition, and thus we can also use the term “arbitrage” to describe any event where 
one security is mispriced (e.g. an option offered with a negative premium: the NPV of 
that trade would always positive although variable so anyone buying it would be 
arbitraging the price spread).  
While this definition of arbitrage may appear too similar to the traditional one to 
add anything additional of substance to the analysis, we maintain that it provides a clear 
guideline with which to distinguish arbitrage transactions from more common 
speculative endeavors. Furthermore, it allows us to make the claim a priori that 
mispricings that can be arbitraged according to our definition will disappear once 
discovered, while the same cannot be stated about speculative situations. This does not 
imply that the concept of the costless arbitrage cannot exist outside of a theoretical 
construct owing to the uncertainty created by actions occurring over time. Alertness to 
unexploited profit opportunities (as in Kirzner 1973) necessarily implies an uncertain 
environment, as prices would already be at their equilibrium levels otherwise. In our 
proposed definition we can make the certain claim that entrepreneurs will exploit certain 
trades, while other speculative endeavors will rely on the standard expected cost-benefit 
calculus. Other prevailing definitions and uses of arbitrage do not make the same 
distinction, and thus indiscriminately claim that a variety of transactions will be 
undertaken due to arbitrage when in fact no such clear rationale exists.  
In most of the literature on financial asset pricing, “arbitrage” does not refer to a 
specific activity but is rather a necessary assumption needed to solve a system of 
equations. While such uses of arbitrage pricing include transactions that cannot be 
arbitraged in some instances, a more egregious violation in the use of the term is the 
arbitrage-free condition. This situation arises when all assets are priced appropriately 
such that no individual´s gain can outpace the market return (in either absolute or, more 
commonly, risk-adjusted terms). This literature is not concerned with concrete examples 
of arbitrage, but rather the condition is used to rule out certain solutions to a system of 
differential equations. The literature that emerged after Schleifer and Vishny (1997) has 
been motivated by the inability of “no-arbitrage pricing” models to match empirical 
data.  
We redefine arbitrage as “when one or more assets are bought or sold at the 
same time locking in a monetary profit with certainty at the time of trading, even if it 
cannot be certain as to the amount of such profit.” This allows us to return to the root of 
the problem of price formation and provides a standard to judge the concrete action of 
arbitrage. This is in contrast to the theoretical and empirical literature, which faces 
difficulties establishing what actually should be included as an arbitrage opportunity 
(i.e., can the trade occur across markets, time, are resource constraints binding, etc.). 
There are six key advantages to using our modified definition of arbitrage rather than its 
more standard usage.  
1) The importance of arbitrage is that we can derive economic laws from it: we know 
arbitrage opportunities will be exploited once discovered. The reason is that arbitrage 
means certain profits. In distinction, many modern uses of the term try to use economic 
theory to derive additional cases where arbitrage may exist. These types of applications 
amount to putting the cart before the horse as they use arbitrage as an equilibrating 
mechanism when the proper conditions for its use do not exist.  
2) Arbitrage and speculation differ from each other only to the extent that we move 
from a certain realm to an uncertain one. We know what will happen when an arbitraged 
situation is discovered; on the other hand we cannot state the outcome of speculative 
situations. 
3) Trades outside the proposed definition are speculative (including so called 
convergence trades) because we do not know their outcomes a priori. 
4) Arbitrage can only take place in a dynamic and uncertain environment. This insight 
rectifies the anecdote popular amongst some economists that two people could never see 
a ten dollar bill on the street in front of them, as if the profit opportunity actually existed 
it would already be exploited (as popularized in Malkiel 1973). This very situation does 
in fact exist, and the associated arbitrage profits result because of the very existence of 
true uncertainty. The market that functions within this fundamentally uncertain 
environment will make such opportunities short-lived, but still allows for their 
existence.  
5) In a dynamic environment, arbitrage is the culmination of previous entrepreneurial 
actions that alter an existing price array. 
6) Those actions aimed at obtaining arbitrage profits will lead to the same effects as any 
other entrepreneurial act: the creation and transmission of information and social 
coordination. 
 
Our proposed use of arbitrage sets a specific domain for arbitrageable 
transactions, and places all others into the category of speculation. This approach finds 
affinity with Huerta de Soto’s (2010a) dynamic concept of the entrepreneurial function, 
whereby he explicitly includes both ideas of time and uncertainty to the pricing process: 
From a temporal standpoint, entrepreneurship can be practiced in two different 
ways: synchronically or diachronically. The first is called arbitrage and is 
entrepreneurship exercised in the present (understood as the temporal present 
from the actor’s point of view) between two distinct places or situations in 
society. The second is called speculation and consists of the exercise of 
entrepreneurship between two different points in time. One might think that 
entrepreneurship, in the case of arbitrage, amounts to discovering and 
transmitting information which already exists but which is dispersed, while in 
the case of speculation, “new” information is created and transmitted. 
Nevertheless, this distinction is purely artificial, because discovering what 
“already existed,” though no one knew it existed, is synonymous with creating. 
Thus, qualitatively and theoretically speaking, there is no difference between 
arbitrage and speculation. (Huerta de Soto 2010a: 69) 
 
Both acts of arbitrage and speculation are essential for social coordination according to 
Huerta de Soto. His use of arbitrage does not correspond to what we define as arbitrage 
but to the act of purposely looking for arbitrage opportunities. If we do not assume the 
entrepreneur knows what prices can be arbitraged ab initio, he must first obtain that 
information, and, as we have already explained this is better considered as an act of 
entrepreneurship which is speculative in nature and takes place in time. The result of 
this activity will be the other facets of entrepreneurial actions: the creation and 
transmission of information leading to social coordination (Huerta de Soto 2010a: 64-
67).  
Entrepreneurs will embark in those actions in order to obtain profits through 
both intratemporal and intertemporal trades, but they can never be certain of success, 
giving further justification to Huerta de Soto’s (2010a:69) claim that “there is no 
difference between arbitrage and speculation.” Even though this idea is more in line 
with our view of arbitrage and speculation and, in our opinion, is one step forward from 
Kirzner’s concept as it also includes the Misesean insights of uncertainty and time, the 
difference between arbitrage and speculation can still be highlighted further. In a 
dynamic environment, arbitrage is the culmination of previous entrepreneurial actions. 
As such, any activity involving arbitrage is akin to an action embedded within another 
action. In the uncertain world the most we can say is that it is an action that is part of a 
broader action whose beginning is speculative in nature, i.e., the act of finding the 
arbitrageable prices. This is not to say that the market is necessarily inefficient to the 
extent that the very act of arbitrage must be predicated on an uncertain outcome, but 
rather a truthful depiction of the reality of the pricing process. This emphasis is apparent 
in much of Kirzner’s theoretical work, whereby disequilibrium prices allow for 
arbitrage opportunities and it is the entrepreneurial action of finding (or being alert to) 
these prices that can be arbitraged that is a speculative action with uncertain success.12 
In fact, while some authors, e.g., Fama (1991), view arbitrage opportunities as 
indicative of inefficient markets, the role of efficient markets is to coordinate the 
uncertain and disparate valuations of individuals that are the ultimate cause of arbitrage 
opportunities.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has overviewed the primary definition of arbitrage currently in use in 
mainstream financial economics literature and some of its applications. Despite being a 
seemingly simple and straightforward concept, it is used in a quite fluid manner which 
compromises its usefulness. We have provided an alternative definition to shed light on 
these prevailing uses and applications.  
 In particular, by defining arbitrage as only those transactions which result in a 
positive net present value at all times during the duration of an exchange, we have 
added rigor to the use of the term. Specifically we have been able to exclude a large 
                                                            
12 This is a variation on the argument given by Huerta de Soto (2010b) against Grossman and Stiglitz’ 
concept of “informationally efficient markets”, the result of which will be an “equilibrium degree of 
disequilibrium” (1980: 393, see also 1976). As the costs of gathering information are unknown in advance 
of the search, and the expected benefits are also shrouded in uncertainty until realized, there can be no 
conscious decision to search for a profit opportunity but leave it unexploited once a certain cost is 
surpassed. Compare with Rizzo (1979: 9; 1995:12), Hülsmann (1997:48), and Sautet (2000: 45). 
body of “quasi-arbitrage” activities, such as those found in Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
and thus limit the use of the concept to its proper domain.  
One final conclusion of this work is that many prior uses of arbitrage are now 
exposed for the speculative endeavors they are. The more stringent definition made use 
of herein may have the drawback of making pricing theory reliant on arbitrageable 
mispricings more limited (and perhaps more difficult) to apply, but at least it is more 
honest.  
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